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ABSTRACT
Mechanism design is concerned with settings where a policy maker
(or social planner) faces the problem of aggregating the announced
preferences of multiple agents into a collective (or social), system-
wide decision. One of the most important ways for aggregating
preference that has been used in multiagent systems is election.
In an election, the aim is to select the candidate who reflects the
common will of society. Despite the importance of this subject, in
real-world situations, under special circumstances, the result of
the election does not respect the purpose of those who execute it
and the election leads to the dissatisfaction of a large amount of
people and in some cases causes polarization in societies. To analyze
these situations, we introduce notions called social frustration and
social disappointment and show which voting rules can prevent
them in elections. In addition, we propose new protocols to prevent
social disappointment in elections. A version of the impossibility
theorem is proved regarding social disappointment in elections,
showing that there is no voting rule for four or more candidates
that simultaneously satisfies avoiding social disappointment and
Condorcet winner criteria. We empirically compared our protocols
with seven well-known voting protocols and we observed that our
protocols are capable of preventing social disappointment and are
more robust against manipulations.
KEYWORDS
Mechanism design; social choice theory; voting procedures; impos-
sibility theorem; social disappointment; manipulation
1 INTRODUCTION
Social choice theory is concerned with the design and analysis of
methods for collective decision making [25]. Voting procedures
are among the most important methods for collective decision
making. Voting procedures focus on the aggregation of individuals’
preferences to produce collective decisions. In practice, a voting
procedure is characterized by ballot responses and the way ballots
are tallied to determine winners. Voters are assumed to have clear
preferences over candidates (alternatives) and attempt to maximize
satisfaction with the election outcome by their ballot responses.
In social choice theory, it is emphasized that the result of an elec-
tion must reflect the general will of voters. For this reason, in social
choice theory, there are different and various criteria to address
the efficiency and desirability of a voting procedure. Voting proce-
dures are formalized by social choice functions, which map ballot
response profiles into election outcomes [5]. However, despite the
fact that this is an important matter, in the real world situations
sometimes the winner of an election is the one who causes a vast
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dissatisfaction in the society and in some cases leads to polarization
[14]. For example, according to Reilly [21], in societies with deep
ethnic cleavages such as Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Northern
Ireland, Estonia and Fiji, elections can encourage extremist eth-
nic appeals, zerosum political behaviour and ethnic conflict, and
consequently often lead to the breakdown of democracy. Reilly
in [21] and Grofman and Feld in [14] examine the potential of
electoral engineering as a mechanism of conflict management in
divided societies, and show that avoiding the selection of extremist
candidates with substantial first round but little overall support is
a central merit of voting rules like alternative vote and Coombs
method as compared to plurality. As a result, it is desirable that the
alternative defeated by a majority in pairwise contests against any
other alternatives (i.e., Condorcet loser), and also the alternative
that is at the bottom of at least half of the individual preference
profiles should not be elected-both to make less likely the election
of candidates with limited overall support and to mitigate ethnic
conflict in divided societies.
To avoid social disappointment in voting mechanisms, this pa-
per introduces new criteria called social frustration and social
disappointment respectively. In fact, we consider three factors
relevant to picking (and designing) a voting rule to be used to se-
lect a candidate(s) from among a set of choices: (1) avoidance of
Condorcet losers (social frustration), (2) avoidance of social dis-
appointment, (3) resistance to manipulability via strategic voting.
Based on these factors, we analyze some of well-known voting pro-
tocols and we show that which ones prevent social frustration or
social disappointment in elections. For example, since procedures
like Borda and Copeland do not elect Condorcet loser in elections
[22], we recommend them to avoid social frustration in voting.
Also, we show that Coombs method prevent social disappointment
in elections. Furthermore, we design two new voting rules called
Least Unpopular (LU) and Least Unpopular Reselection (LUR) Pro-
cedures that both of them avoid social disappointment in voting,
while retaining monotonicity criterion as opposed to Coombs. A
version of the impossibility theorem is stated and proved regarding
to the notion of social disappointment, showing that there is no
voting rule for four or more candidates that simultaneously satisfies
avoiding social disappointment and Condorcet winner criteria. In
order to address the robustness of discussed voting rules in this
paper against manipulation, we design four scenarios of manipula-
tion such as control and bribery, and evaluate the resistance of our
proposed protocols i.e., LU and LUR against manipulations.
Summary of results. Based on experimental results, as we ex-
pected, social disappointment does not happen for Coombs, LU ,and
LUR methods. Despite the fact that Copeland and Borda cannot
avoid social disappointment, both of them lead to social disappoint-
ment in fairly small number of cases, which is also consistent with
theoretical results. The best performance against manipulation via
strategic voting belongs to the LU and LUR in all scenarios, showing
that these procedures are more robust against manipulation. In all
cases, plurality has the worst performance.
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Novelty. The central point of this paper is the claim that some
of the same arguments that have proposed to justify replacing
of plurality with alternative vote (a.k.a. instant runoff) [4, 15, 21]
apply with greater or equal force to the replacing plurality with the
Coombs, LU, or LUR procedures. Grofman and Feld in [14] made
the argument that electoral reformers who have been advocating
the alternative vote/instant runoff need to take a serious look at
its close relative, the Coombs rule. In this paper, we argue that
the LU and LUR procedures are directly comparable with Coombs
with respect to one of our three criteria i.e., avoidance of social
disappointment and both of them are superior to Coombs with
respect to one of the three criteria i.e., resistance to manipulability
via strategic voting.
Our main contributions are the following:
• We introduce new criteria called social frustration (SF) and so-
cial disappointment (SD) respectively, and we show that which
protocols avoid SF and SD in elections.
• We provide new voting protocols named the least unpopular (LU)
and the least unpopular reselection procedures (LUR), and we
show that both of them prevent SD in elections.
• We provide and prove an impossibility theorem by considering
the notion of social disappointment.
• We experimentally compare the numerical results obtained from
the implementation of nine voting rules, andwe show that Commbs,
LU, and LUR are capable to prevent SD, and also more success-
ful than the other procedures regarding their resistance against
manipulation in different scenarios. An R language package that
implements nine voting procedures and fourmanipulation scenar-
ios, all described in this paper, alongwith the resulting experimen-
tal data are available at: https://github.com/majavid/AAMAS2019.
2 BASIC DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS
In this paper we consider elections with more than two candidates.
In order to define some central concepts such as ballot, profile,
voting rule, and so on, we need to consider the following basic
definitions and notations.
Preference Relations. In set theory |A| denotes the number
of elements in the finite set A. Any subset R of A × A is a binary
relation on A, and in this case we write "aRb" to indicate that (a, b)
∈ R, and we write "¬(aRb)" to indicate that (a, b) < R. The binary
relations we are most concerned with satisfy one or more of the
following properties.
Definition 2.1. A binary relation R on a set A is:
re f lexive i f ∀x ∈ A,xRx
symmetric i f ∀x ,y ∈ A, if xRy then yRx
asymmetric i f ∀x ,y ∈ A, if xRy then ¬(yRx)
antisymmetric i f ∀x ,y ∈ A, if xRy and yRx then x = y
transitive i f ∀x ,y, z ∈ A, if xRy and yRz then xRz
complete i f ∀x ,y ∈ A, either xRy or yRx .
Also, a binary relation R on a set A is a weak ordering (of A) if
it is transitive and complete and a linear ordering (of A) if it is
also antisymmetric. If R is a weak ordering of A, then the derived
relations of strict preference P and indifference I are arrived at by
asserting that xPy iff ¬(yRx) and xIy iff xRy and yRx.
Definition 2.2. If A is a finite non-empty set (which we think of
as the set of alternatives (candidates) from which the voters are
choosing), then an A-ballot is a weak ordering of A. If, additionally,
n is a positive integer (where we think of N ={1, . . . ,n} as being
the set of voters), then an (A, n)-profile is an n-tuple of A-ballots.
Similarly, a linear A-ballot is a linear ordering of A, and a linear (A,
n)-profile is an n-tuple of linear A-ballots.
The following definition collects some additional ballot-theoretic
notation we will need.
Definition 2.3. Suppose P is a linear (A, n)-profile, X is a set of
alternatives (that is, X ⊆ A), and i is a voter (that is, i ∈ N). Then:
topi (P) = x i f f ∀x ∈ A,xRiy
maxi (X , P) = x i f f x ∈ X ,∀y ∈ X : xRiy
mini (X , P) = x i f f x ∈ X ,∀y ∈ X : yRix
Elections and desirable properties. In the context of social
choice theory, we assume that there is a set A whose elements are
called alternatives (or candidates)1 and typically denoted by a, b,
c, etc. There is also a set P whose elements is called people (or
voters). Each person p in P has arranged the alternatives in a list
(with no ties) according to preference. Such a list will be called an
individual preference list, or, for brevity, a ballot. A sequence of
ballots is called a profile. The following definition uses the concepts
of weak and linear orderings to formalize these election-theoretic
terminologies. In this paper, we only consider elections with more
than two candidates. A voting procedure is a special kind of function
where a typical input is a profile and an output is a single alternative,
or a single set of alternatives if we allow ties, or "NW" indicating
that there is no winner. Because of the importance of this notion,
we record it here formally as a definition, along with six desirable
properties for comparison of different voting rules.
Definition 2.4. Suppose that A is a non-empty set, n is a positive
integer, N={1, . . . ,n}, and V is a function whose domain is the
collection of all (A, n)-profiles. Then V is a voting rule2 for (A, n) if,
for every (A, n)-profile P, the election outcome V(P) is a subset of
A. We say that V satisfies:
• Always-a-winner Condition (AAW), if V(P), ∅. In words, a vot-
ing procedure satisfies AAW condition if for every sequence of
individual preference lists, the procedure outputs at least one
winner.
• Condorcet winner condition (CWC) if for every x ∈ A:
x ∈ V (P) iff ∀y ∈ A,W (x ,y, P) ≥W (y,x , P),
whereW (x ,y, P) denotes the number of voters who rank x over
y on their ballot in P i.e.,W (x ,y, P) = {i ∈ N |xPiy}. Here, Pi is
a strict preference on A such that xPiy iff ¬(yRix), where Ri is a
binary relation on A. An alternative x is said to be a Condorcet
winner if it is the unique winner in Condorcet’s method.
• Pareto condition, if for every pair of alternatives x, y ∈ A, if xPiy
for every i, then y < V(P). A voting procedure is said to satisfy
Pareto condition (or just Pareto) if for every pair of x and y, all
the voters prefer x to y, then y is not a social choice.
• Monotonicity (or V is monotone) if x ∈ V(P), i ∈ N and y ∈ A
with y Pi x, assume that the profile Q exists such that P|N−{i }
=Q|N−{i }3, Pi |A−{x,y } =Qi |A−{x,y } , and x Qi y then x ∈ V(Q). A
voting procedure is said to be monotone if x is a social choice
and someone changes his or her preference list by moving x up,
then x should still be the social choice.
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition, if for ev-
ery pair of (A, n)-profiles P and P’, and every pair of alternatives x,
y ∈ A, if x ∈ V(P) and y < V(P) and Ri |{x,y } = R′i |{x,y } for every
1We use "alternatives" and "candidates" interchangeably.
2We use "voting rule", "voting procedure", and "voting protocol" interchangeably.
3If R is a binary relation on A and S ⊆ A, then the restriction of R to S, denoted R |S , is
the binary relation on S given by R |S = R ∩ (S ×S ).
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i, then y < V(P’). A voting procedure satisfies independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition whenever the social prefer-
ences between alternatives x and y depend only on the individual
preferences between x and y. The condition of independence of
irrelevant alternatives was first used by Arrow in 1951 [2]. We
say that an alternative is a Condorcet loser if it would be defeated
by every other alternative in a kind of one-on-one contest that
takes place in a sequential pairwise voting with a fixed agenda4.
• Condorcet loser criterion (CLC), if there exists x ∈ A such that for
all y ∈ A, W(x,y,P) < W(y,x,P), whereW (x ,y, P) = {i ∈ N |xPiy},
then x < V(P)5. Further, we say that a social choice procedure
satisfies the Condorcet loser criterion (CLC) provided that a Con-
dorcet loser is never among the social choices. (see [27, 28] for
more details and examples).
Voting procedures. In this paper, we consider nine examples
of social choice procedures such as Condorcet’s method 6, Plu-
rality rule, Hare system 7 (is also known by names such as the
"single transferable vote system" (stv) or "instant runoff voting"),
Borda count [9], sequential pairwise voting with a fixed agenda
(Seq. Pairs), Copeland 8, Coombs [8] and dictatorship. For formal
definitions and examples, see [27, 28]. Here we just define Hare and
Coombs procedures formally. In order to define these procedures
we need the following notation and definition:
Suppose that A is a set of alternatives, n is a positive integer, and
V is a voting rule defined not for just (A,n), but for (A′,n) for every
A′ ⊆A. Now, for every (A,n) profile P, we can consider the sequence
⟨W1, . . . ,W |A |⟩, whereW1 = V (P),W2 = V (P |W1 ),W3 = V (P |W2 ),
etc. Notice that
(i) A ⊇W1 ⊇W2 ⊇ · · · ⊇W |A | , and
(ii) ifWj =Wj+1, thenWj+1 = · · · =W |A | .
The Hare procedure and the Coombs procedure are special cases
of the general idea of repeatedly using a single procedure to break
ties among winners.
Definition 2.5. One repeatedly deletes the alternative or the al-
ternatives with the fewest first-place votes, with the last group
of alternatives to be deleted tied for the win. More precisely, V is
the Hare voting rule (also called "the Hare system" or "the Hare
procedure") if V = V ∗H where VH (P) is the set of all alternatives
except those with the fewest first-place votes in P (and all tie if all
have the same number of first-place votes).
Definition 2.6. One repeatedly deletes the alternative or the al-
ternatives with the most last-place votes, with the last group of
alternatives to be deleted tied for the win. More precisely, V is the
Coombs voting rule (also called "the Coombs procedure") if V =
V∗C where VC (P) is the set of all alternatives except those with the
most last-place votes in P (and all tie if all have the same number
of first-place votes).
3 SOCIAL FRUSTRATION AND SOCIAL
DISAPPOINTMENT IN VOTING SYSTEMS
To avoid vast dissatisfaction and polarization in society because of
the outcome of elections, we consider two intuitively compelling
4When we speak of a "fixed agenda," we are assuming we have a specified ordering of
the alternatives.
5From the definition of the Condorcet loser it is clear that if existed would be unique.
6With Condorcet’s method, an alternative x (if any) is among the winners if for every
other alternative y, at least half of the voters rank x over y on their ballots. Our usage
of the term Condorcet’s method follows [28].
7This procedure was introduced in 1861 by Thomas Hare [27].
8This procedure was introduced in an unpublished 1951 note by A. H. Copeland [27].
requirements that one may impose on voting procedures: (1) the
alternative(s) defeated by a majority in pairwise contests against
any other alternatives (Condorcet loser) should not be elected, and
(2) the alternative that is ranked at the bottom of at least half of
the individual preference profiles should not be elected. In order to
deal with these situations, we introduce new notions called social
frustration and social disappointment in voting systems respectively.
Definition 3.1. (Social frustration): Suppose that A is a non-empty
set (the set of alternatives), n is a positive integer (the number of
voters), N={1, . . . ,n} (the set of voters), and V is a voting rule for (A,
n). If there exist x ∈ A such that for all y ∈ A, W(x,y,P) < W(y,x,P),
whereW (x ,y, P) = {i ∈ N |xPiy}, and x ∈ V(P) we say that social
frustration (SF) in voting has occurred.
In words, if the result of the voting procedure includes Condorcet
loser, we say that social frustration in voting has occurred.
Definition 3.2. (Social disappointment): Suppose that A is a non-
empty set (the set of alternatives), n is a positive integer (the number
of voters), N={1, . . . ,n} (the set of voters), and V is a voting rule for
(A, n). If there exist x ∈ A such that |{i ∈ N |mini (A, P) = x}| ≥ n2
and x ∈ V(P) we say that social disappointment (SD) in voting has
occurred. Also, we say that V satisfies the social disappointment
criterion (SDC), if there exist x ∈ A such that |{i ∈ N |mini (A, P) =
x}| ≥ n2 , then x < V(P).
In words, social disappointment in voting happens when the
outcome of an election (for 3 or more alternatives) includes an
alternative which is at the bottom of at least half of the individual
preference lists. If in the definition of social disappointment instead
of using the expression "at least half of" one uses the phrase "more
than the half of", then a new definition of social disappointment
will be obtained called strict social disappointment. We leave this
to the reader to verify that the Condorcet’s method, the Borda
count rule, the Seq. Pairs., and the Coombs’ procedure can avoid
strict social disappointment. Also, the occurrence of strict social
disappointment will result in both SF and SD. However, the reverse
may not hold true.
In order to illustrate the key concepts SF and SD, consider the
following example9.
Example 3.3. Consider the following situation in which there
are four Dutchmen, three Germans, and two Frenchmen who have
to decide on which drink to be served for lunch (only a single drink
will be served to all).
Voters 1-4 Voters 5-8 Voters 9 and 10
Milk Beer Wine
Wine Wine Beer
Beer Milk Milk
Now, which drink should be served based on these individuals’
preferences? Milk could be chosen since it has the most agents
ranking it first. Milk is the winner according to the plurality rule,
which only considers how often each alternative is ranked in the
first place. However, the majority of agents will be dissatisfied
with this choice as they prefer any other drink to Milk. For such
an occasion in terms of social choice theory one can say that the
Condorcet Loser-in this example milk-is the social choice and this,
9We have adapted this example from [6].
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on its own, is one of the undesirable situations in the social choice
theory. In other words, social frustration has occurred.
Now to look at it from another perspective, Milk is the alternative
which is at the bottom of more than half of the voters’ preferences
lists i.e., social choice is an alternative with the least social support
and has themost social dissatisfaction or to be evenmore serious has
the most social resentment. In other words, social disappointment
has occurred.
3.1 Social Frustration and Condorcet Loser
Based on Definition 3.1, social frustration happen if the outcome of
voting includes a Condorcet loser. In this subsection, we provide
an example that shows the likelihood of plurality rule to electing
Condorcet loser is not very unusual and, indeed, happens in real-life
political elections. Then, we argue that which voting rules are able
to prevent social frustration i.e., choosing a Condorcet loser.
Grofman and Feld [14] pointed out that picking the Condorcet
loser as the winner is a poor voting method, indeed. Plurality rule
can have this flaw [6]. To show its importance, we provide an im-
portant historical voting situation where resulted in social disaster
by electing a Condorcet loser as a winner of an election.
In a well-known US senatorial contest in the State of New York
in 1970, the candidate from the Conservative party (Buckley) was a
Condorcet Loser because he would have lost in one-to-one general
election contest with either the Democrat (Otinger) or the liberal
Republican (Goodell). Yet Buckley won the general election with a
plurality vote despite his more liberal opponents received 60% of the
vote. Although the liberal Republicans were a minority among the
Republican voters, most liberal Republicans preferred Goodell to
Buckley, and in a general election putting Buckley against Goodell,
they would have been joined by a high proportion of the Democrats
who would also have clearly preferred Goodell to Buckley. On
the other hand, while Otinger might not have done as well as
Goodell among liberal Republicans in a one-to-one contest with
Buckley, he would have made up for that by getting virtually all the
Democratic vote. We can see this as a situation involving single-
peaked preferences where the two liberal candidates (Goodell and
Otinger) split the liberal vote, allowing the least preferred choice
among a majority of the voters to win (see [14, page 647]).
Therefore, in order to prevent social frustration in elections, we
recommend to use the voting protocols such as Condorcet, Borda,
Copeland, or Seq. Pairs. Because all of them satisfy the Condorcet
loser condition [22, Chapter 4]10.
3.2 Social Disappointment in Voting Systems
In this section, we justify the importance of the notion of social
disappointment in real-world political elections, and show that
which voting protocols avoid SD. Then, we show that social frus-
tration and social disappointment are two distinct concepts and the
occurrence of none of them implies the occurrence of other one.
Some civilizations live in a way that the racial/ethnic/religious
divisions can potentially cause polarization in the society. In sit-
uations where centrism is defined in terms of conciliatory views,
the necessity of choosing the moderate candidates and keeping
away from the extremist candidates-who are not supported by a
broad spectrum of people-are shown [14]. Similarly, we design a
mechanism that satisfies these properties and avoid SD in elections.
The main question here is that whether any of the given pro-
tocols in this article prevent SD in voting systems? The voting
10Authors of [22] use the term of anti-Condorcet criterion instead of CLC.
procedure that prevents social disappointment in voting systems is
Coombs method (Coombs rule) was introduced by the famous psy-
chologist Clyde Coombs [8]. Suppose that there is a candidate that
is at the end of at least half of the preference profiles. The Coombs’
procedure deletes this alternative from the profile lists in the first
stage and does not let this candidate be elected, so social disappoint-
ment can not occur for this alternative. Coombs procedure satisfies
the properties in Table 1.
Table 1: Distinctive characteristics of Coombs method.
AAW CWC Pareto Mono IIA SDC CLC
Coombs YES No YES No No YES No
Grofman and Feld [14] have shown that many conclusions sug-
gested as a justification for getting replaced by those supporting
Hare system can be used as even stronger and more accurate evi-
dences for Coombs’ procedure rather than the plurality rule. They
also argue that the supporters of the Hare system, like Donald
Horowitz, have proven that when the Hare system is used the prob-
ability of a moderate candidate’s winning the election instead of
an extremist is higher than that when the plurality rule is used. A
moderate candidate here refers to the one who has the support of
most of the voters but is not their first priority, and an extremist
here refers to the candidate who is the first priority of many voters
but loses ballot in one or more one-on-one competitions with the
other candidates. The influence and permeation of Horowitz’s idea
is proven in places such as Fiji and Guinea new Papua [14, 21].
Therefore, societies in which racial, religious and ethnical conflicts
can potentially lead to polarization, if the purpose of election’s
organizers is to prevent this situation and to help with electing a
moderate politician, noticing social dissatisfaction is highly neces-
sary. It seems that in such situations it is essential to use protocols
like Coombs procedure which is in line with this intention.
The following proposition shows that social frustration and so-
cial disappointment in voting systems are two distinct concepts
and none of them implies the other one.
Proposition 3.4. The definitions given for social frustration and
social disappointment in voting systems are completely different; the
occurrence of one of them never guarantees that of the other.
Proof. Consider the following profile: Applying the plurality
Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 Voter 4
a a b c
c b c b
b c a a
rule, a is the socially-selected candidate and SDwill occur. However,
a is not the Condorcet loser.
Now, consider the following profile: Obviously, a is the Con-
32 voters 38 voters 10 voters
b c b
a a c
c b a
dorcet loser but, he is not at the end of at least half of the individual
preference lists. Therefore, if one protocol (for instance LU protocol
which will be introduced in the next subsection) considers a as the
winner of the social selection, despite its being the Condorcet loser,
the SD will not occur. □
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3.3 The Least Unpopular (LU) and the Least
Unpopular Reselection (LUR)
First, we show that plurality, Borda, Condorcet, Copeland, Seq.
Pairs., and Hare do not satisfy SDC.
Proposition 3.5. Plurality, Borda, Condorcet, Copeland, Seq. Pairs.,
and Hare method do not satisfy SDC.
Proof. • Plurality: see Example 3.3 that shows plurality rule
violates SDC.
• Borda: Borda rule failes to satisfy SDC. More precisely, the Borda
count rule can always prevent SD in voting except in one case. In
this case the social choice set will consist of all the alternatives.
For example, consider the three alternatives ’a’, ’b’, and ’c’ and
the following sequences of two preference lists:
Voters 1 and 2 Voters 3 and 4
a c
b b
c a
The alternatives ’a’, ’b’ and ’c’ are the social choice when the
Borda count procedure is used. Although ’a’ is the social choice
(also ’c’), it is at the bottom of half of individual preference lists
and so social disappointment has taken place.
Note that there are ’k’ candidates (k ≥ 3) and ’n’ voters (n ≥ 3).
The total sum of scores in Borda count rule is equal to:
n((k − 1) + (k − 2) + ... + 2 + 1 + 0) = n(k − 1)k2
Now consider that ’n’ is an odd number, without loss of gener-
ality, and also consider that x1 is a social choice and there is SD
in voting, so x1 must be at least the last preference in n+12 of
individual preferences lists. Now consider the most optimistic
possibility that in n−12 of the remaning lists x1 is at the top. Thus
Borda score for the alternative x1 equals: (n−1)(k−1)2 . Now if this
amount is subtracted from the whole Borda score it gives:
k(k − 1)n
2 −
(k − 1)(n − 1)
2 =
(k − 1)(kn − k + 1)
2
Now if, in the most optimistic possibility, the remaining score
is again shared among the other k − 1 candidates equally, the
amount of Borda score for every other candidate is (k−1)n+12
which clearly is more than Borda score for x1, and this is against
x1 being the social choice. In the end if the number of voters is
an odd number and voting is done according to Borda count rule,
SD will definitely not occur.
Now consider that ’n’ is an even number, without loss of gener-
ality and also consider that x1 is a social choice and there is SD
in voting. So, in the most optimistic possibility, Borda score for
x1 is equal to: n(k−1)2 . Now, if this amount is subtracted from the
whole Borda score gives:
k(k − 1)n
2 −
(k − 1)n
2 =
(k − 1)n(k − 1)
2
If, in the most optimistic possibility, the remaining score again
shared among the other k − 1 candidates equally, the amount of
Borda score for every other candidate would be (k−1)n2 which is
clearly equal to the Borda score for x1 and thus the social choice
set consists of all the candidates. Otherwise, if the remaining
score is shared among every other candidate, x1 can no longer
be the social choice according to Borda count rule. The reason is
that there is at least one candidate that has a score higher than
that of x1.
• Copeland, Condorcet, and Seq. Pairs.: Consider the following
profile (each column shows a ballot of each voter):
d d d c b b
a a c a c c
b b a b a a
c c b d d d
The alternative ’d’ is the unique social choice when the Copeland
and Condorcet’s method is used. Although the alternative ’d’
is a social choice, it is at the bottom of half of the individual
preference lists and so social disappointment has taken place.
Also, suppose that alphabetic ordering of the alternatives is the
agenda. So, {c,d} is the social choice and SDC is violated where
Seq. Pairs. is used for voting.
• Hare: Consider the three alternatives ’a’, ’b’, and ’c’ and the
following sequence of ten preference lists grouped into voting
blocks of size four, three, and one:
Voters 1-4 Voters 5-7 Voters 8-10
a c b
b b c
c a a
The alternatives ’a’ is the social choice set when the Hare system
is used. Although ’a’ is the social choice, it is at the bottom of
more than half of the individual preference lists and so social
disappointment has taken place.
□
Of the seven voting procedures we looked at, only Coombs’s
method satisfies SDC. However, Coombs does not satisfy the mono-
tonicity criterion, formalizes the crucial idea that increased support
for a candidate never hurts, and may help her to win. Otherwise,
voters would be afraid to cast their ballots in an honest way, aware
that a vote for their sincere first choice could harm the cause of elect-
ing her. We, therefore, want to pursue a voting procedure to satisfy
the monotonicity criterion [22]. Suppose we are seeking a voting
procedure that satisfies SDC and monotonicity simultaneously.
In this section, we introduce a new voting protocol that satisfies
monotonicity and prevents SD in voting systems.
Definition 3.6. (The Least Unpopular (LU) procedure) The social
choice(s) in the least unpopular procedure (LU) is (are) the alterna-
tive(s) that appear(s) less than the others at the bottom of individual
preference lists. More precisely, V is the LU procedure if V(P)={x ∈
A|lp(x) is minimum}, where lp(x) = {i ∈ N |mini (A, P) = x}.
This protocol satisfies the AAW, Monotonicity, and social dis-
appointment criterion, but does not satisfy the CWC, CLC, Pareto,
and IIA criterion.
Proposition 3.7. The Least Unpopular procedure does not satisfy
the CLC, CWC, IIA, and Pareto criteria.
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Proof. Consider the four alternatives ’a’, ’b’, ’c’, and ’d’ and the
following profile:
Voters 1 and 2 Voter 3 Voter 4
a c d
b a a
c b b
d d c
The alternatives ’a’ and ’b’ are the social choices when the Least
Unpopular procedure is used. Thus, the alternative ’b’ is in the set
of social choices even though everyone prefers ’a’ to ’b’. This shows
that the Pareto criterion fails. Now consider the three alternatives
’a’, ’b’, ’c’ and the following profile:
Voters 1 and 2 Voter 3
a b
b c
c a
The alternative ’b’ is the social choice when the Least Unpopular
procedure is used. However, ’a’ is clearly the Condorcet’s winner,
defeating each of the other alternatives in one-on-one competitions.
Since the Condorcet’s winner is not the social choice in this situa-
tion, it is clear that the Least Unpopular procedure does not satisfy
the Condorcet’s winner criterion. In other words, the alternative ’b’
is a non-winner. Now suppose that voter 3 changes his or her list
by interchanging the alternatives ’a’ and ’c’. The lists then become:
Voters 1 and 2 Voter 3
a b
b a
c c
Notice that the alternative ’b’ is still above ’a’ in the third voter’s list.
However, the Least Unpopular procedure now has ’a’ and ’b’ tied
as the winner. Thus, although no one changed his or her preference
regarding the alternatives ’a’ and ’b’, the alternative ’a’ changed
position from being a non-winner to being a winner. This shows
that the independence of irrelevant alternatives fails in the Least
Unpopular procedure.
Now, consider the following profile: Obviously, a is the Con-
32 voters 38 voters 10 voters
b c b
a a c
c b a
dorcet loser but LU protocol considers a as the winner of the social
selection. This shows that LU does not satisfies CLC. □
Proposition 3.8. The Least Unpopular procedure satisfies the
SDC, AAW, and Monotonicity criterion.
Proof. Since |A|, the number of candidates is a finite number,
so V(P)={x ∈ A|lp(x) is minimum} , ∅, which means LU satisfies
AAW criterion.
Assume that alternative a appears at the bottom of at least half
of the individual preference lists. Since |A| ≥ 3, so a < {x ∈
A|lp(x) is minimum}, a < V (P), which means LU satisfies SDC.
LU satisfies monotonicity because raising candidate a up on
some preference lists can never increase the number of last-place
votes that a receives, nor can it decrease the number of last-place
votes that any other candidate receives. Hence, if a wins the election
before such a change, she wins afterwards as well. □
The Pareto criterion is important in the context of Arrow’s im-
possibility theorem [1, 2]. However, LU does not satisfy this cri-
terion. Suppose we are seeking a voting procedure that satisfies
SDC, Pareto, and monotonicity simultaneously. Here, we introduce
a new voting protocol that satisfies Pareto and monotonicity, and
also prevents social disappointment in voting systems.
Definition 3.9. (Least Unpopular Reselection (LUR)) First, the set
of alternatives appearing least often at the bottom of individual pref-
erence lists (i.e., the set of least unpopular alternatives) is chosen. If
this set has only one member, it is the social choice. Otherwise, the
remaining alternatives (if any) are removed and the procedure LU
is run for the set obtained from the previous stage. This procedure
is repeated until it cannot be continued (because a new set of alter-
natives cannot be produced). The set obtained in the last repetition
is the set of social choice. Formally, one repeatedly removes the
alternative or the alternatives except those with the least last-place
votes, with the last group of alternatives to be removed was tied for
the win. More precisely, V is the least unpopular reselection (LUR)
if V = V∗LU R , where VLU R (P) is the set of all alternatives with the
least last-place votes in P (and all tie if all have the same number of
first-place votes).
To clarify the definitions of LU and LUR, we illustrate these two
voting procedures with a single example.
Example 3.10. Consider the following voting profile: For each
Voter 1 Voter 2 Voters 3 and 4
a a b
c b c
b c a
of LU and LUR procedures, we calculate what the resulting social
choice is.
LU: Since lp(a) = 2, lp(b) = 1, and lp(c) = 1 then {b, c} is the the
social choice when the LU procedure is used.
LUR: We decide which alternative(s) occur(s) at the bottom of the
fewest lists and remove the remaining alternative(s) from all the
lists. In this phase, a is removed from each list leaving the following:
Voter 1 Voter 2 Voters 3 and 4
c b b
b c c
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Now, c occurs at the bottom of 3 of 4 lists, and thus is eliminated.
Hence, b is the social choice when the LUR procedure is used.
Proposition 3.11. LUR protocol satisfies the AAW, Monotonicity,
Pareto criteria, and SDC, but does not satisfy the CWC, CLC, and IIA
criteria.
Proof. If candidate a is ahead of candidateb on every preference
list, candidate a has no last-place votes and therefore b suffers
elimination in the at most last round. Hence LUR method satisfies
Pareto.
The rest of proof is the same as proof of Proposition 3.7 and
3.8. □
3.4 Properties of our Voting Procedures
Some of results from this paper are summarized in Table 2. This ta-
ble provides the answers to 63 questions of the form "Does method
X satisfy criterion Y ?" The rows are indexed by 9 methods. The
columns are indexed by 7 criteria: always-a-winner, the Condorcet
winner, Pareto, monotonicity, independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives, social disappointment, and Condorcet loser criterion.
Based on the comparison in Table 2, first, no method satisfies
all 7 of the criteria. This should not surprise us, because Taylor
shows that no method can simultaneously satisfy AAW, IIA, and
CWC [26]. Even if we are willing to dispense with IIA, we still face
a difficulty because Theorem 4.1 in the next section shows that no
method (for four and more candidates) can satisfy CWC and SDC
simultaneously. It should be noted that on of the advantage of LU
and LUR methods in compare with Coombs is that LU and LUR
satisfy monotonicity criterion but Coombs method does not.
Table 2: Comparison of voting procedures.
AAW CWC Pareto Mono IIA SDC CLC
Condorcet NO YES YES YES YES NO YES
Plurality YES NO YES YES NO NO NO
Borda YES NO YES YES NO NO YES
Hare YES NO YES NO NO NO NO
Seq. Pairs YES YES NO YES NO NO YES
Copeland YES YES YES YES NO NO YES
Coombs YES NO YES NO NO YES NO
LU YES NO NO YES NO YES NO
LUR YES NO YES YES NO YES NO
4 AN IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM BASED ON
THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL
DISAPPOINTMENT IN VOTING SYSTEMS
In this section, we provide a version of the impossibility theorem
regarding the notion of social disappointment in elections, show-
ing that there is no voting rule for four or more candidates that
simultaneously satisfies SDC and CWC.
Arrow’s theorem in [2], have motivated a vast amount of re-
search on multicandidate elections. There are now several dozen
Arrow-type impossibility theorems that address a wide array of
social choice situations, but all have the same theme of the collec-
tive incompatibility of conditions which, taken separately, seem
reasonable and appealing [5].
Taylor proved in [26] and also [28, pp. 28-31] that there is no
voting procedure for three or more alternatives that satisfies the
always-a-winner criterion, the independence of irrelevant alter-
natives, and the Condorcet winner criterion. What follows is an
impossibility theorem based on the concept of social disappoint-
ment in voting systems. This theorem can be seen as part of the
story of the difficulty with "reflecting the will of the people." The
proof of this theorem, like that of Arrow’s theorem, makes critical
use of the voting paradox of Condorcet [10].
Theorem 4.1. There is no voting procedure for four or more
alternatives that satisfies the SDC and the Condorcet winner criterion.
Proof. Assume that there is a voting procedure that satisfies
the Condorcet winner criterion. We show that if this procedure
is applied to the profile that consists of the Condorcet’s voting
paradox [10], then it produces a winner which will lead to social
disappointment.
Suppose that there is a voting procedure that satisfies the Con-
dorcet winner criterion. Consider the following profile for (n+1)
alternatives and 2n voters, where n ≥ 3 (each column corresponds
with a ballot of voters):
xn+1 xn+1 · · · xn+1 xn+1 x1 x2 · · · xn−1 xn
x1 x2 · · · xn−1 xn x2 x3 · · · xn x1
x2 x3 · · · xn x1 x3 x4 · · · x1 x2
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
xn−1 xn · · · xn−3 xn−2 xn x1 · · · xn−2 xn−1
xn x1 · · · xn−2 xn−1 xn+1 xn+1 · · · xn+1 xn+1
The alternative xn+1 is the unique social choice when the Con-
dorcet’s method is used. Although the alternative xn+1 is a social
choice, it is at the bottom of half of the individual preference lists
and so social disappointment has taken place.
□
Proposition 4.2. There is a voting procedure for three alterna-
tives that satisfies the SDC and the Condorcet winner criterion.
Proof. None of the voting procedures mentioned in this article
satisfies the SDC and the Condorcet winner criterion. Here we
design a hybrid voting rule that we call unique-Condorcet Coombs
(UCC) method and we show that this protocol satisfies the SDC
and the Condorcet winner criterion. UCC is the method that selects
the Condorcet candidate when it is unique, otherwise selects the
output of the Coombs method.
If in Condorcet method more than half of voters place x at the
bottom of individual preference lists then for sure x would not be a
social choice with UCC method and in this case social disappoint-
ment would not occur. However, if the number of voters is an even
number and precisely half of the voters place x at the end of their
lists, one of these two possibilities will happen:
(1) Not all the voters in the other half place x at the top of their
lists, in which case, x will not definitely be a social choice with
UCC method and social disappointment will not occur.
(2) All the voters in the other half also place x at the top of their lists,
in which case x will definitely be in the set of social choice with
Condorcet method. In this case, if there are only three alternatives,
the set of social choice with Condorcet method will certainly have
more than one member, and so UCC procedure uses Coombs
method to determine the output of the election. Therefore, SD
will not occur.
As a result, UCCmethod satisfies the SDC and the Condorcet winner
criterion when we have three alternatives in the election. □
5 EVALUATION
In section 3, we showed Coombs, LU, and LUR voting protocols
avoid social disappointment. In this section, we empirically evaluate
the performance of discussed voting protocols from two point of
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views: avoidance of social disappointment and resistance to manipu-
lation via strategic voting because it is an important benchmark for
desirability of a voting procedure [7]. For this purpose, we designed
two different setups and we conducted a sensitivity analysis to
evaluate the performance of voting rules in both cases.
5.1 Experimental Setup
In this section, we first define the independent (IV-SD) and de-
pendent variables (DV-SD) for performance evaluation of voting
procedures relating to SDC and resistance against manipulation.
5.1.1 Social disappointment experimental setup.
IV-SD-1: number of candidates. To identify how vulnerable each
voting rule is with respect to SDC, we vary the number of candidates
between 3 and 6. For two reasons we did not consider the number
of candidates greater than 6. First, in many real-world scenarios like
presidential elections in many countries in the world 11, variants of
voting rules is used and most of the time the number of candidates
are relatively small. Second, based on our experiments, the chance
of social disappointment occurrence in elections decreases when
the number of candidates increases, and so we did not consider the
number of candidates greater than 6.
IV-SD-2: number of voters. Voting protocols may perform dif-
ferently depending on how many voters have participated in the
election. So, we generate profiles with different number of voters
between 6 and 10. Based on our experiments, the chance of occur-
rence of SD decreases in elections, where the number of candidates
is fixed but the number of voters increases [16]. This is in particular
relevant for considerable number of situations such as multiagent
systems, where the number of voters are relatively small.
IV-SD-3: number of profiles. Since a well-designed experiment
takes into account the randomness of elections, we generate 1000
profiles for each pair of i and j , where i is the number of candidates
and j is the number of voters.
IV-SD-4: voting procedures. We compare the performance of
nine voting rules i.e., plurality,Condorcet, Borda, Hare, Coombs,
Copeland, Seq. Pairs., LU, and LUR with respect to SD.
DV-SD-1: outcome of elections. To assess the vulnerability of
voting rules concerning SD, we check the occurrence of SD in
elections for each random profile and voting procedure.
In summary, in order to test the vulnerability of voting rules to
electing a candidate who violates social disappointment criterion,
we generated 1000 random profiles for each pair of i and j, where
i = 3, 4, 5, 6 is the number of candidates and j = 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 is the
number of voters. For this purpose, we used sample() function in
R language to generate a random ballot based on the number of
candidates for each voter in a profile. For simplicity, we assumed
that the distribution of the society is uniform and all of ballots
are valid. Then, we run nine mentioned voting procedures in this
paper i.e., plurality, Condorcet, Borda, Hare, Coombs, Copeland, Seq.
Pairs., LU, and LUR on each profile. Finally, we checked whether
SD for each election has happened or not. An R language package
that implements our algorithms is available at [16].
5.1.2 Manipulation experimental setup.
Since an important benchmark for desirability of a voting rule is its
resistance to manipulability via strategic voting, we designed four
scenarios of manipulating elections such as control and bribery,
and tested the performance of each voting protocol in all different
scenarios. Before explaining the details of setup for each scenario,
11https://libguides.princeton.edu/elections/foreign
first, we briefly review the meaning of manipulation, control, and
bribery in elections.
In many situations, voters may vote strategically. That is, they
may declare preferences that are not their true ones, with the aim
of obtaining a better outcome for themselves. This is often referred
to as manipulation or strategic voting. Voting rules that are never
manipulable are also referred to as strategyproof [7]. The Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem shows that there is no strategy-proof voting
rule that simultaneously satisfies certain combinations of desirable
properties [13, 23]. Control and bribery are two families of problems
modeling various ways of manipulating elections. Control problems
model situations where some entity, usually referred to as the chair
or the election organizer, has some ability to affect the election
structure by adding or deleting voters or candidates. On the other
hand, bribery models situations where the structure of the election
stays intact (we have the same candidates and the same voters), but
some outside agent pays the voters to change their votes [11, 12].
Now, we define the independent (IV-M) and dependent variables
(DV-M) for performance evaluation of voting procedures against
different scenarios of manipulation.
IV-M-1: number of candidates. To identify how vulnerable each
voting rule is with respect to manipulation, we vary the number
of candidates between 3 and 10. In many real-world situations12,
variants of voting rules is used and most of the time the number of
candidates are relatively small and less than 10.
IV-M-2: number of voters. In order to create a more realistic
profiles, we generate random profiles with different number of
voters i.e., 10, 100, and 1000.
IV-M-3: number of profiles. Since a well-designed experiment
takes into account the randomness of elections, we generate 30
profiles for each pair of i and j , where i is the number of candidates
and j is the number of voters.
IV-M-4: manipulation scenarios. We consider 4 manipulation
scenarios to evaluate the robustness of voting procedures against
manipulation (we elaborate each of them later in this section):
(1) Constructive Control by Adding/Deleting Voters’ Ballots,
(2) Constructive Control by Adding/Deleting Candidates,
(3) Bribery/Self-manipulation, and
(4) Social Network and Social Media Influence on Voters’ Prefer-
ences During Election Days.
IV-M-5: voting procedures. We compare the performance of
nine voting rules i.e., plurality, Condorcet, Borda, Hare, Coombs,
Copeland, Seq. Pairs., LU, and LUR with respect to manipulation
scenarios.
DV-M-1: outcome of elections after manipulation. We compare
the outcome of original elections with the outcome of elections after
each manipulation scenario for a large number of configurations.
In summary, to compare the performance of LU and LUR with
other seven well-known voting rules against manipulation, we
generated 30 random profiles for each pair of i and j, where i =
3, 4, . . . , 10 is the number of candidates and j = 10, 100, 1000 is the
number of voters. For this purpose, we used sample() function in
R language to generate a random ballot based on the number of
candidates for each voter in a profile, we assumed that the distribu-
tion of the society is uniform and all of ballots are valid. Then, we
run all above mentioned voting procedures on each profile.
The manipulation scenarios we considered for the independent
variable IV-M-4 are based on the following justification:
12https://libguides.princeton.edu/elections/foreign
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(1) Constructive Control by Adding/Deleting Voters’ Ballots:
The issue of control by adding, deleting voters ballots (or a com-
bination of them) is very natural and, indeed, happens in real-
life political elections. For example, it is widely speculated that
"adding" about 8 millions ballots in favor of Mahmoud Ahmadine-
jad to the 2009 Islamic Republic of Iran presidential election had
the effect of ensuring Ahmadinejad’s victory (otherwise, Mir-
Hossein Mousavi would have won or gone to the second round
i.e., the runoff election)13. We consider a situation that the chair
or the election organizer is able to delete randomly 10 percent
of voters’ ballots and replace all of them by his or her individual
preference list. For this case, we removed randomly 10 (or 20)
percent of voters’ ballots and then replaced all of them with a
fixed random ballot.
(2) ConstructiveControl byAdding/DeletingCandidates: One
control action the chair might exert is to change the candidate set,
either by adding some new candidates from a given set of spoiler
candidates (hoping to make p’s most competitive rivals weaker
relative to p), or to delete up to k candidates from the given elec-
tion (to get rid of p’s worst rivals) [12]. For example, it is widely
speculated that "adding" Nader to the 2000 U.S. presidential elec-
tion had the effect of ensuring Bush’s victory (otherwise, Gore
would have won) [12]. We consider a situation that the chair’s
goal in exerting some control action is to make a given candidate
p the winner of the resulting election. In this scenario, candidate
a performs very well in pre-election polls and candidate b is the
most competitive rival of p. The chair deletes candidate b in or-
der to make p’s most competitive rival (i.e., candidate a) weaker
relative to p. We removed the candidate who has obtained third
rank in the election without manipulation (one can consider this
as the result of pre-election polls) to increase the chance of the
candidate, who has earned the second rank in the pre-election
polls, to being a winner.
(3) Bribery/Self-manipulation: Election bribery problemsmodel
situations where an outside agent wants a particular alternative
to win and pays some of the voters to vote as the agent likes
[12, 17, 20, 30]. Self-manipulation problem addresses situations
where the fans of candidate p know that they have no chance
to win the election, however, most of them agree that candidate
q-who performs well in pre-election polls-is the closest person to
their political ideals among other candidates. So, these group of
voters form a coalition among themselves and manipulated the
election by voting non-truthfully i.e., by swapping between their
sincere first choice candidate p and their second choice candidate
q who had a better chance of winning the election. Assume that
other voters vote truthfully. Here, we consider a situation that
there is a minority group of voters that most of them are unani-
mous that their second choice candidate has a better chance of
winning the election, and so they swap their sincere first choice
with their second choice. For this case, according to the result of
the election without manipulation (again one can consider this
as the result of pre-election polls) there is a minority group of
voters that most of them are unanimous that their second choice
candidate has a better chance of winning the election, so we
swapped their sincere first choice with their second choice.
(4) SocialNetwork and SocialMedia Influence onVoters’ Pref-
erence Lists: As online social networks have become significant
sources of information for potential voters, a new tool in an at-
tacker’s arsenal is to effect control by harnessing social influence,
13http://www.bbc.com/persian/46110885
for example, by spreading fake news and other forms of misin-
formation through online social media [29]. Also, it is possible
that the sincere preferences of the voters are influenced by the
votes of their friends. In this case, each agent votes strategically,
taking into consideration both her preferences, and her (limited)
information about the preferences of other voters, assuming that
the information the agent has comes from her friends in the
social network and from a public opinion poll [24]. In real life,
political parties often try to influence the outcome of elections
by means of social media (e.g., see [3, 18]). For example, social
bots (or chatbots)14 distorted the 2016 U.S. presidential election
online discussion. According to [3], the presence of social media
bots can indeed negatively affect democratic political discussion
rather than improving it, which in turn can potentially alter pub-
lic opinion and endanger the integrity of the presidential election.
Also, authors of [29] show that election control through social
influence is a salient threat to election integrity. Here, we con-
sider a situation that 10 percent of voters exchange their sincere
first choice candidate with candidate p under influence of p’s
advertisements, fake news, rumors, and chatbots through social
media during election days. For this case, we randomly selected
10 percent of voters and changed their ballots in a way that the
candidate, who has earned the second rank in the election with-
out manipulation, became their first choice (without changing
their preferences about other candidates).
In the next step, we run our voting rules on each new profile after
manipulation. Finally, we checked that whether manipulation had
effect on the outcome of each election or not. In the next subsection,
we show that voting procedures LU, LUR, and Coombs had better
performance against manipulation, in all of above scenarios, than
other seven voting rules in this paper.
5.2 Experimental Results for Social
Disappointment in Voting Procedures
Figure 1 shows the performance of voting protocols against social
disappointment. As we expected (see section 3), social disappoint-
ment does not happen for Coombs, LU, and LUR methods. However,
other procedures cannot prevent social disappointment. Among
voting procedures, Plurality has the worst performance. An inter-
esting observation is that the number of social disappointment
occurrence in elections decreases when the number of candidates
increases as one can see in Figure 1. Another noticeable point is that
Borda and Copeland violate SDC in fairly small number of cases,
indicating that social disappointment happens for these methods
just in rare cases (see the proof of the Proposition 3.7 that supports
this observation theoretically).
5.3 Experimental Results for Resistance
Against Manipulation in Voting
In this section, we compare the outcome of original elections with
the outcome of elections after each manipulation scenario for each
scenario explained in experimental setup:
(1) Constructive Control by Adding/Deleting Voters’ Ballots:
In this case, as shown in Figure 2, LU and LUR are more robust
against manipulation in this scenario compared to other proce-
dures. Figure 2 shows that the number of affected elections in
this scenario is independent of the number of candidates. Except
14The chatbots are basic software programs with a bit of artificial intelligence and
rudimentary communication skills. They can send messages on Twitter based on a
topic, usually defined on the social network by a hashtag symbol, like #Clinton.
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Figure 1: Performances of voting procedures: Number of occur-
rence of social disappointment in different elections has been shown
with different colors based on the number of candidates. Social dis-
appointment does not happen for Coombs, LU, and LUR. When the
number of candidates increases, the number of social disappoint-
ment occurrence in elections decreases. The performance of Borda
and Copeland rules are acceptable in this regard.
for LU and LUR, other procedures perform as bad as plurality
rule in this scenario.
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Figure 2: Performances of voting procedures against manipulation
in constructive control by deleting and replacing 10 percent of
voters’ ballots. LU and LUR are more robust than others. , and also a
meaningful difference regarding the performance of other methods
cannot be seen in this scenario. Number of affected elections has
been shown with different colors corresponding to the number of
candidates.
(2) Constructive Control by Adding/Deleting Voters’ Ballots
(second scenario): As shown in Figure 3, LU and LUR are more
robust against manipulation in this constructive control manip-
ulation scenario compared to other procedures. No meaningful
difference can be seen relating to the performance of other seven
protocols in this scenario. Figure 3 shows that the number of
affected elections in this scenario is independent of the number
of candidates.
(3) Constructive Control by Adding/Deleting Candidates: As
shown in Figure 4, Coombs, LU and LUR are more robust against
manipulation compared to other procedures. In contrast with
first scenario i.e., constructive control by adding/deleting voters’
0
100
200
300
400
500
plu
ral
ity
Co
nd
orc
et
Bo
rda Ha
re
Co
om
bs
Co
pe
lan
d LU LU
R
se
q_
pa
irw
ise
Figure 3: Performances of voting procedures against manipulation
in the scenario of constructive control by deleting and replacing 20
percent of voters’ ballots. LU and LUR present better performance
than other methods, and also other procedures perform as bad as
plurality rule in this scenario. Number of affected elections has
been shown with different colors corresponding to the number of
candidates.
ballots, Copeland performs slightly better than Borda in this case.
Also, in the evaluated scenarios, the number of affected elections
in this scenario does not depend on the number of candidates.
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Figure 4: Performances of voting procedures against manipula-
tion in constructive control by deleting a candidate. Coombs, LU,
and LUR have the best performance and plurality has the worst.
Number of affected elections has been shown with different colors
corresponding to the number of candidates.
(4) Bribery/Self-manipulation: As shown in Figure 5, LU and
LUR are more robust against manipulation in this scenario com-
pared to other procedures. Except for plurality and Borda rules,
other seven well-known methods have acceptable performance
in this scenario. In contrast with first and last scenario, Borda
surprisingly does not perform as good as Copeland, Condorcet,
Seq. Pairs., Hare, and Coombs.
(5) SocialNetwork and SocialMedia Influence onVoters’ Pref-
erence Lists: As shown in Figure 6, LU and LUR are more robust
against manipulation. The worst performance belongs to plural-
ity and Coombs method has the best performance after LU and
LUR. Also, the number of affected elections in this scenario is
independent of the number of candidates.
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Figure 5: Performances of voting procedures against manipulation
in bribery/self-manipulation. The best performance belong to LU
and LUR. Except for plurality and Borda rules, other seven methods
have acceptable performance. Number of affected elections has
been shown with different colors corresponding to the number of
candidates.
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Figure 6: Performances of voting procedures against manipulation
in the context of social media influencer. LU and LUR have the best
performance. Except for plurality, there is no meaningful difference
between other remaining rules. Number of affected elections has
been shown with different colors corresponding to the number of
candidates.
Compared to seven well-known voting rules, all of experimen-
tal results indicate that LU and especially LUR’ voting protocols
are considerably better and more resistant to manipulations. The
implication of this study is that election experts who have been
advocating the alternative vote/instant runoff may advocate also
LU and especially LUR rules to avoid social disappointment and
electing extremist candidate with substantial first round but little
overall support in elections.
6 THREATS TO VALIDITY
In our experiments, we increase representativeness by carefully
designing scenarios to model manipulation in elections, using a pub-
lished approaches explained in [12] and combining it with a custom
approach for generating random profiles based on the insight from
real elections. Nonetheless, our results must be interpreted within
the constraints of how those models were generated. In fact, the
use of synthetic data and a controlled election environment does
not consider several other scenarios, such as influence of diversity
in district-based elections [19] or the impact of weighted voting on
social disappointment.
For evaluations with real elections, voters diversity cannot be
excluded and may affect the results, even though we carefully es-
tablished ground truth by measuring the performance of voting
procedures on uniform randomness and repeating random elections
many times. We implemented the approaches according to the de-
scription provided in the literature [12] and we set the parameters
according to the recommendations provided by the authors, but
cannot exclude small differences due to implementation constraints.
To take into consideration the randomness of profiles, we generated
random profiles many times and calculated the absolute frequencies
of all affected elections. Despite confidence from synthetic data,
the reader must be careful when generalizing results beyond the
studied conditions. For example, the results cannot be generalized
to weighted voting or non-uniform societies.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed two new concepts called social frustra-
tion and social disappointment-both to make less likely the election
of candidates with limited overall support and to mitigate ethnic
conflict and polarization in divided societies. We have also designed
two new voting rules to prevent social disappointment in elections.
In addition, a version of the impossibility theorem stated and proved
regarding social disappointment in elections, showing that there
is no voting rule for four or more candidates that simultaneously
satisfies avoiding social disappointment and Condorcet winner cri-
teria. Finally, we empirically evaluated the occurrence of social
disappointment and we showed that the performance of our pro-
posed protocols are superior than other seven well-known voting
rules against manipulation in four different scenarios.
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